SIMONE LUZZATTO’S IMAGE OF THE IDEAL PRINCE AND THE ITALIAN TRADITION OF REASON OF STATE

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The Historical Background of Luzzatto’s Political Ideas

Early modern Venice witnessed the production of a rich body of philosophical and historical literature on her political institutions and governmental organisation which is characterized by adherence to the idea of reason of state. This literature had a significant impact on the political thought of Simone Luzzatto, one of the pivotal figures of Renaissance Jewish political thought. This paper intends to investigate more closely how Luzzatto articulates his portrait of the ideal ruler, which constitutes one of the central aspects of his political theory, and how this relates to the antecedent tradition of Medieval Islamic and Jewish political philosophy and reflects the influence of the Italian tradition of “ragion di Stato”, especially in the form it took in the political writings of 16th and 17th century Venice.

Simone (Simha) Luzzatto (ca. 1582-1663) served as a rabbi of Venice’s Jewish community for almost 57 years. He was highly esteemed for his erudition and his eloquence and took an active part in the dealings between the Jewish community and Venice’s government concerning such matters as charter renewals. His most important work, the Discorso circa il stato degl’ hebrei et in particulor dimoranti nell’inclita città di Venetia (Discourse on the condition of the Jews and in particular the inhabitants of the illustrious city of Venice)\(^1\), was published in Venice in 1638. Its composition was occasioned by the 1630s attacks on Venice’s Jewish population and the eminent threat of their expul-
sion due to a major scandal of bribery of the Judiciary, the cornerstone of the Venetian political system, through Jewish intermediaries. The Discorso was very influential on the rabbi and preacher of the community of Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam Menasseh ben Israel’s Humble Addresses, which he presented in 1655 to Oliver Cromwell in his effort to achieve the return of Jews to England by demonstrating their loyalty, and on the English deist John Toland’s Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews of Great Britain and Ireland (London 1714). In 1651 Luzzatto published the Socrate-Overo dell’Humano Sapere (Socrates, Or concerning human knowledge), a dialogue that was dedicated to the leaders of the Venetian government and modelled on those of Plato, dealing with general philosophical questions about the nature of human knowledge and its moral implications.

For a fuller understanding of Luzzatto’s political ideas, it is advisable to dwell shortly on the history of Venice’s Jewish population in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Jews were first granted permission to reside in Venice at the end of the 14th century, as a result of a change in the Venetian government’s policy concerning small-scale moneylending. Since 1254 borrowing money on pledges at fixed rates of interest had been illegal in Venice. However, due to the Black Death (1348-40) and the economic problems that followed Venice’s Third Genoese War (1350-55), the Great Council proceeded to review its attitude toward moneylending. In the aftermath of the Fourth Genoese War (1378-81), since it had imposed heavy taxes, Venice faced a great shortage of money and illegal moneylending at high rates. In 1382, Venetian authorities took legal measures to allow any person, whether Venetian or foreign, to lend at a maximum rate of 10 percent a year on pledges and 12 percent on notes. The overwhelming majority of those who accepted the invitation were Jews. The authorisation of the Jews to reside in Venice and the creation of the Jewish community were developments that the Venetian government would not have foreseen and reactions were strong, particularly on the part of the clerics. In 1516, the Senate, in an effort to appease the Church, decided to segregate them in an enclosed neighbourhood, the Ghetto Nuovo (New Ghetto), and to place restrictions on their physical freedom. In order to ensure that no Jewish residents would move around during the night and to guarantee their safety, gates were built at both entrances of the ghetto, high walls were erected on the two sides of the ghetto overlooking small canals, and the area was to be guarded by two boats around the clock. By the middle of the 17th century, Jews were in control of a large part of Venice’s foreign
trade and continuous waves of Jewish immigrants were on the verge of playing a major role in the daily activities of the city.

**Luzzatto’s Concept of the Ideal Prince: Its Sources**

Luzzatto criticizes the “artificial republics” in strong terms, such as those sketched out by “theoretical” political thinkers, Socrates, Plato and Thomas More, the only contemporary to whom Luzzatto makes a reference. A large part of Luzzatto’s polemic centres upon the ideas of social and economic equality, the abolition of private property, and the condemnation of luxuries, as expounded by Plato and Thomas More, the “Moderno Inventore della Utopia”, as Luzzatto calls him. Siding with Aristotle, he flatly dismisses such theories as opposed to reality and human nature and for this reason regards them as doomed to failure. He expresses instead his explicit preference for the teachings of practical political thinkers, such as Aristotle and Cicero, who devoted their energies to the thorough study of political reality as it was. A great deal of Luzzatto’s praise is addressed to Aristotle for investing all his spirit to reorganize and correct Plato’s model of the perfect city.

Luzzatto pictures his ideal prince as a prophet who makes law and confers justice. At the same time, he compares him with the first lawgivers and founders of civil governments, such as Solon, Lycurgus, and Romulus, and stresses that if they had not come and organized with their wisdom and understanding the human multitude into different levels and classes, its ugliness would have been even greater than that of the famous ancient chaos. With these considerations Luzzatto proceeds to an open and outright repudiation of the utopian tradition as advocated by Plato and More, and he appears to be in full agreement with Machiavelli’s notion of the wise and omnipotent legislator who is responsible for building up a well-organized society and creating forms of government. It is no accident that Luzzatto in his lavish praise of the Venetian government extols Venice’s lawgiver for having laid down her eternal laws, which guaranteed her enduring social and political stability and set the foundations for her mixed constitution.

In Luzzatto’s eyes the ruler is the supreme lawgiver and God’s representative on earth. It is therefore appropriate for him to share in the actions of virtuousness and righteousness, because it is impossible that the likeness of an image will differ from the image itself.
In a novel interpretation of Solomon’s saying «It is the glory of God to conceal a thing, whereas the glory of kings consists in searching out a matter», Luzzatto urges that the hidden secrets of God and the true religion be obscure and hidden away from the ignorant multitude. In Luzzatto’s view, it is fitting for princes and kings to penetrate into the innermost meaning of things, in order to be in a position, by means of their authority and the example they give, to lead the people to the true worship and to avoid being misled or trapped in the webs of lies of the superstitious and their illusions. Luzzatto explains that it was precisely this line of reasoning that dictated that the ancient Israelites adhered to superstitions, a fact that Cornellius Tacitus particularly emphasized in his sharp criticism of the Jews. He holds that such an astute political thinker as Tacitus - in Luzzatto’s words “Famoso Historico Romano” and “Maestro del Governo Civile” - should have perceived the political significance of superstition as an instrument for facilitating the obedience of the masses and preserving social stability. Citing Isocrates’s story about the Egyptian King Busiris who imposed many curious laws and odd religious customs upon his subjects and ordered them to worship certain animals despised by other people, Luzzatto indicates that Busiris did this in order to sound out their reactions to what was revealed and foresee the way they would act in more obscure matters.

Most significantly, Luzzatto’s profile of the optimum ruler-lawgiver retains some of the constituents of Averroes’s image of the ideal ruler, in fact those hallmarks that are congruous with the model of the Machiavellian prince which Luzzatto very closely follows. Adhering to Al-Farabi’s notion of the ideal ruler of the Islamic community as a philosopher-lawgiver, Averroes depicts the ideal ruler as embodying both the functions of the lawgiver, the philosopher and the imām. It is especially noteworthy that Luzzatto mentions with praise Maimonides and his Guide of the Perplexed, a work that in his view is the product of sublime wisdom, pointing out that Maimonides was a contemporary of the commentator Ibn Rushd (Averroes). He also adds that he is in possession of some of Gersonides’s Hebrew translations of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle’s works. Averroes’s commentary on Plato’s Republic does not appear on the list. However, it is highly probable that Luzzato had access to Jacob Mantinus’s Latin translation of this commentary; Mantinus’s translation was published in 1539 and included together with the rest of Averroes’s commentaries in the Venice edition of Aristotle’s Opera Omnia, which enjoyed a broad circulation in the period between the second half of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century.
The idea of the gulf between the active prince and the passive masses is fundamental to the political teaching of the *Discourse*. Like Machiavelli and Averroes, Luzzatto looks upon the people as a pile of stones, made of raw marble, which is used by the sculptor, that is the leader, for many different purposes, whenever he needs them, and this is the reason why he keeps them in large quantities. Of course, this analogy presupposes a dialectic relation between the ruler and the masses. As the sculptor needs amorphous and raw material in order to work, in the same way the statesman needs the masses.

Moreover, along with Averroes Luzzatto regards religion as a useful instrument in the hands of the prince for deterring the citizens from breaking a law, as Machiavelli stressed. Both Machiavelli and Averroes agree on the indispensability of religion for the health and well-being of states. Machiavelli considers it as the duty of princes and heads of republics to uphold the foundations of religion, in order to keep their people religious, and consequently well-behaved and united. For this reason, he counsels the would-be prince to foster and encourage religion even if he is convinced that it is quite fallacious, and this should be done the more, the wiser the rulers are, and the better they understand the natural course of things, the more this should be done. As Machiavelli points out, many sagacious men followed this practice, which gave rise to the belief in the miracles that are celebrated in religions however false they may be. The sagacious rulers attributed great importance to these miracles, no matter whence or how they originated. Wise men, including Lycurgus and Solon, had recourse to religion, in order to avoid negative reactions to new laws. Thus Numa, founder of Rome’s religion and lawgiver, feigned that he held private conferences with a nymph who dictated to him all that he wished to persuade the people to do, because Numa mistrusted his own authority and thought it would prove insufficient to introduce new and unaccustomed ordinances in Rome. Admiring Numa’s goodness and wisdom, the Roman people yielded in all things he advised.

As will become evident below, Luzzatto’s ideas on religion present striking affinities with Averroes’s ideas on the importance of myths and religion for the ideal city he is intent upon creating. Of course, the emphasis on the political dimensions of religion is a traditional topos in the works of various Classical and medieval thinkers such as Aristotle, Augustine, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and, last but not least, of Marsilius of Padua, who demonstrates in his *Defensor pacis* the necessity of religion as a mere “invention” of
the “philosophers”, such as Hesiod and Pythagoras, on socio-political grounds.\(^{28}\)

According to Averroes, one of the most opportune means for inculcating virtue in the citizens is persuasion, that is, by use of rhetoric and poetics. One cannot anticipate that many will arrive at knowledge of the theoretical sciences by recourse to demonstrative arguments, because such reasoning transcends the grasp of the majority of people. Averroes thus advocates that the many be led through persuasion to believe things relating to the theoretical sciences, since such belief can function as a guideline for what they ought to do and refrain from doing.\(^{29}\) His discussion on the role of myths in governance is solidly grounded on the analogy between the ruler and the physician. Myths function as alternative means for inducing the masses to the truth of philosophy-revelation and can act upon them like medicine. Just as only the doctor administers drugs, solely the king employs lies with the masses. On the other hand, if an artisan is found lying, it is proper that he should be subjected to punishment. Averroes deems it necessary to tell the masses that the possible damage a man of the masses may do in relation to the rulers in case he lies is like the damage caused by a patient when he lies to his doctor about his illness. If the masses were to attain happiness, there is no escaping the fact that lawgivers have to avail of fictitious tales.\(^{30}\) Averroes cites approvingly a story in the Republic as a sample of a clever, perhaps prudent, or in Socrates’s terms, a “noble” or “well-born” lie (“pseudos gene"

Like Al-farabi, Averroes conceives of religion as consisting of opinions and actions, determined and limited by conditions that the ruler lays down for the group, seeking to achieve a specific goal through the active utilization of these opinions and actions.\(^{32}\) At another place, in his famous Tahafut al-tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) the Arab thinker states that religions are, according to the philosophers, obligatory, since they lead towards wisdom in a way universal to all human beings. Philosophy only leads a certain number of people to the knowledge of intellectual happiness, and they therefore have to learn wisdom, whereas religion aims at the instruction of the masses generally.\(^{33}\) Similar ideas are found also in Maimonides’s philosophy. Maimonides maintains that the Law calls on people to adopt certain beliefs that are necessary for political welfare, such as the belief that God is violently angry with those who
disobey him and hence it is necessary to fear and dread him and to take care not to disobey.\textsuperscript{34}

The Essential Qualities of the Perfect Ruler

Luzzatto is categorical that the prince should be impervious to such an influence of superstition. He is also very careful to underline the dangers emanating from such a situation. Among the examples from Greek and Roman history he cites in order to corroborate this view, the Romans stand out as an interesting case of very intelligent people who engaged systematically in examining the viscera of animals and studying the movement of clouds in the sky when searching for omens, instead of considering the whole spectrum of practical alternatives before taking decisions on the most useful course and acting accordingly.\textsuperscript{35} On these lines Luzzatto proceeds to a relativization of justice. That the prince acts justly toward his own subjects or foreign residents can be accounted for by the fact that he does it for purely utilitarian purposes, in his effort to stave off internal disturbances and rebellion among the people and the latter’s unfavourable reactions towards him. It follows, according to Luzzatto, that the ruler should strive to harmonize his intention to secure the soundness of the regime and social order with the effort to satisfy the people.\textsuperscript{36} He stresses that one of the ruler’s primary tasks consists in ensuring social peace and public order. He also recommends that the ruler permit a great mobility within the state, in order to obviate resentment in the lower strata, and create the feeling in the rich that a change in their social position is inextricably bound up with his condition (“fortuna”).\textsuperscript{37} Luzzatto’s strong preoccupation with the stability of the state is readily explicable, when his works are viewed against the background of the convulsion of the Italian city-states by intense social conflicts and civil discord. As an example of an efficient solution for this problem Luzzatto brings up the laws of the Sabbatical year, which led to a situation where property was at the same time common and privately maintained.\textsuperscript{38}

The only exceptions are, as Luzzatto remarks in an overtly apologetic tone, the Jews. Notably, in the first ten Considerations of his Discorso, he takes great pains to underscore the crucial role the Jews of Venice played in the development of the city and their vital contribution to her social and political stability and grandeur, because of their great potential, especially in the fields of international maritime
commerce and moneylending. As he sees it, only the Jews can lift Venice out of its present difficulties and eventually save her from decline,\textsuperscript{39} which he attributes to the drastic curtailment of her international commercial activities and her intensified efforts to acquire the estate of terraferma.\textsuperscript{40} This assumption puts Luzzatto in complete agreement with the majority of the Venetian political writers of the 16th and 17th century, such as Gasparo Contarini and Paolo Paruta, who held imperial expansion as a potential cause for the collapse of the state.\textsuperscript{41}

Treating the Jews in a fair way cannot serve any utilitarian goals, because they do not have a protector and defender; it is, according to Luzzatto, an act of justice for its own sake. Relying on Plato's idea in the \textit{Laws} that the treatment of slaves is a touchstone for the ruler's ability to dole out justice for its own sake,\textsuperscript{42} he specifies that the treatment of Jews is a barometer of the extent to which the prince imitates the moral perfection of God in harmony with the heroic virtue of his noble spirit. Benevolence and justice toward the native population could originate from a weakness of spirit or fear, humanity toward foreigners could derive from obsequious respect for their ruler, but justice, clemency, protection and defence shown toward the Jews could only result from the noble virtue of an ingenuous spirit, naturally disposed to relieve the oppressed and assist the weak.\textsuperscript{43} This does not in the least make Luzzatto disposed to speak of the function of the ruler in moral terms. In fact, he attempts at several places in \textit{Discorso} to associate the justice of Venetian rule with the treatment of Jews in his own time and to establish that the strength of the Venetian political system consists not only in the excellence of its constitutions, but also in the exemplary treatment of the Jewish element, thus presenting a new version of the “Myth of Venice”.\textsuperscript{44} The justice of the Venetian State is genuinely manifested in its effort to grant all possible protection to the Jews from any group of persons attempting to offend their life or properties, by means of close observance of everything that is promised to them in their charters and privileges.\textsuperscript{45} Elsewhere, however, Luzzatto states that protection of elsewhere the Jews promotes the interests of the state in a double way, first by averting inflicting any harm upon Jews and second by preventing the ruler's becoming a pawn of the will of the people. As he views it, a situation where masses get the upper hand is to be avoided at all costs, since it can result in the fall of the government and the destruction of the state, and princes yielding to anti-Jewish sentiments and tendencies of the masses are failures.\textsuperscript{46}
For Luzzatto there are two features that are essential to the future ruler, namely prudence, which he defines as the ability to think instinctively in accordance with the precepts of expedience, and initiative, which leads to action ("fortezza"). Effective action is the fruit of a good combination of these two elements, since right decision without implementation and conversely, action not grounded on prior reflection can bring no results. Luzzatto thus urges the ruler to take instantaneous and determined action without showing any signs of hesitation and procrastination, if he is to avoid symptoms of disobedience on the part of the citizenry. Monarchic and aristocratic regimes are founded on immediate obedience, in contrast to tyrannies, which strive to oppress the subjects. Championing the disjunction between morals and politics, Luzzatto even goes so far as to concede to the ruler the right to perpetrate cruel and immoral acts when the circumstances require it, in the way rulers of people and military commanders acted when they performed atrocities against their enemies, in order to strengthen the spirit of their men and to elicit the loyalty of the people. Such statements bring into mind Machiavelli’s idea that for the creation of the state and any sort of crisis in general, the prudent ruler must annihilate his potential rivals, act alone and that the same holds for military leadership, and not care about the infamy of cruelty, if he is to safeguard the unity and faith of his subjects.

Luzzatto’s predilection for monarchy finds its forceful expression in his *Socrate*. Monarchy is the best political system, granted that it gives priority to the good of the subjects rather than to the interests of the ruler. In the *Socrate*, Luzzatto qualifies prudence as one of the essential attributes of the ruler specifically in his relations with his ministers. Under prudence he includes a shifty behaviour that the ruler has to adopt in promoting his ministers slowly and with circumspection, keeping a watchful eye on them, so that they do not misuse their power, and in punishing them without any hesitation whenever it is needed.

**Moses as a Key Example of the Ideal Prince**

Significantly, Luzzatto posits Moses and Salomon as the supreme exemplars of the ruler-lawgiver. Moses receives a great deal of Luzzatto’s attention, and it is worth examining Luzzatto’s views on this subject more closely. He compares Moses with the first lawgivers of
the pagan tradition. To his mind, the reformers who arose among ancient nations and laid down laws and commandments were nothing but imperfect people who did not care for the rest of humanity and for this reason their ideas and aims were limited and restricted. Solon for example was content with educating the Athenians according to his laws and justice, Lycurgus confined himself to giving laws and justice to the Spartans, and Romulus did not give it but to his own narrow refuge. This was not the case with the Mosaic Law, since the Torah’s aim was to care for the best of all humankind, with every man viewing himself as a citizen of a single all-embracing republic. This description betrays strong Neo-Stoic influences; it is significant that Luzzato makes once in his Discorso an explicit reference to the Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius, who contributed a great deal to the dissemination of Tacitus’s ideas, since his works, such as the Sospitator Taciti and Politicorum Libri Sex (1589), Lipsius’s chef-d’oeuvre, occupy a central place in the Tacitean tradition of the Renaissance.

Commenting upon Tacitus’s characterization of the Torah as a justification of superstition, carnal lust, sloth, and other evils, Luzzatto describes the Torah as the supreme expression of the wisdom of Moses’s rule, which was exercised in full accord with the principles of the reason of state. His presentation of other leaders of the ancient Hebrew people proceeds along the same lines. In his rebuttal of the calumny of sexual promiscuity that Tacitus levelled against the Jews, Luzzatto remarks in connection with Absalom’s revolt that Absalom committed adultery with his father’s concubines, not out of lust or to denigrate David’s honour or to violate religious laws, but on purely political grounds, out of his strong desire to gain political power. On the advice of the “wise Achitophel”, King David’s counsellor and “the clever political thinker of those times”, Absalom had to prove to his adherents that he was firmly resolved to become David’s successor on the throne while the king was still alive. In order to realize his plan and maintain the full support of his followers, he tried to play down their fears that blood relations would ultimately prevail over the interests of the state and that he would seek a compromise with his father at the end, he put a drastic end to all chances of conciliation with his father and chose fornication with his father’s concubines. Besides, adds Luzzatto, analogous cases of adultery were a frequent phenomenon in classical history and many princes committed cruel and immoral acts against their opponents in their efforts to secure the obedience of their people. Augustus, for instance, performed adultery with the wives of his associates not for sexual pleasure, but for eliciting information about the plots of his enemies.
On the basis of the above observations on the ideas expressed in the *Discorso* and the *Socrate*, one is justified in concluding that to a great measure Luzzatto’s work breathes in the spirit of the reason of state, an idea that found a particularly fertile ground in 16th and 17th century Venice. The term “Ragione di Stato” appears in the *Discorso* when Luzzatto refers to Tacitus as the “great master of the reason of state”, as well as in the *Socrate*. Apart from this, one encounters in the *Discorso* analogous expressions, such as “interessi umani e di stato” and “l’interessi del principe”. Furthermore, Luzzatto’s confrontation with Tacitus is an important indicator of the former’s attitude to Tacitus’s ideas which began infiltrating the historical and political literature already during the Quattrocento. This process resulted in Tacitus’s establishment as the prime historical authority in place of Titus Livius, and the whole tradition of reason of state, as inaugurated by Machiavelli, is heavily indebted to Tacitus’s work.

It is symptomatic of the degree to which Tacitus’s ideas circulated in early modern Venice that in Arrigo Caterina Davila’s *Historia delle guerre civili di Francia* (History of the Wars of Religion in France), a popular work which was published in Venice in 1630, only eight years before the publication of Luzzatto’s *Discorso*, one finds numerous references to Tacitus’ works.

Luzzatto’s portrayal of Moses and Absalom mirrors his abiding concern that the ruler employ the best means for gaining and maintaining political power. In this respect, one notices striking affinities between Luzzatto and Machiavelli. In *The Prince*, Moses ranks among the most outstanding of those who became princes by their own virtue and not through luck or favour. Machiavelli defines him together with Theseus and Cyrus as great men who saved their countries. In the *Discourses* the number of founders of states who possessed “virtù” is reduced to two, Moses and Romulus, who represent respectively the monotheistic and pagan traditions. Moses receives a great deal of Machiavelli’s attention in the discussion about new states that are established by outsiders. Machiavelli hails Moses as the model of the leader of a free people constrained to abandon the land of their birth because of pestilence or famine, and to dwell elsewhere. Jews were outsiders who under Moses’s leadership settled in cities that already existed in the territories they conquered. Machiavelli devotes a comprehensive discussion to the new states, which are formed by virtue of the talents and courage of the leader. The process of creating a new state and ensuring its longevity presupposes a certain kind of political and military leadership and/or a great deal of luck. The
art of the successful lawgiver consists in transforming things from potential to actual, grasping opportunities, and minimizing his dependence on good fortune by exploiting his own abilities. In order to consolidate his authority, Machiavelli stresses, a leader must take all possible measures for eliminating the envy and jealousy of others towards him, in the worst case resorting to the physical liquidation of his potential opponents, just as Moses ordered the Levites to massacre three thousand worshippers of the golden calf for the purpose of ensuring the observation of his laws and institutions.

For a proper evaluation of Luzzatto’s political thought, it is important to examine his political ideas against the background of the tradition of Venetian political literature, especially of the 16th and 17th centuries. It is remarkable that Luzzatto appears in full agreement with many Venetian political writers in that he elevates the notion of reason of state to the ultimate standard of all political actions and his central aim is to provide a set of rules for ensuring domestic tranquillity and political stability and preserving or further extending the power of the prince. In his monumental work *Della Ragion di Stato* (Of the Reason of State), which came out in Venice in 1589, Giovanni Botero embarked upon a great effort to rid the concept of reason of state and the language of the art of the state of any moral dimensions. According to Botero’s succinct definition, reason of state is the knowledge of the proper means for establishing, preserving and enlarging a state, which is viewed by Botero as a “firm empire over a people”. Empires can be established in two ways, either upon the express or tacit will of the people, or by acquisition, as the result of conquest or purchase. Botero’s foremost concern is the endurance of the state of the prince regardless of its origin and legitimacy. The virtue of the prince is of utmost significance for the creation of the state. The prince should epitomize all virtues, yet some are especially conducive to producing love and others reputation. Justice and liberality are essentials for the love and gratitude of the subjects. Among other things a just prince should exercise a constant and severe control over the magistrates, in order to check whether they perform their duties properly, and to avoid corruption, which would turn the hatred toward them against the prince himself. On the other hand, prudence and valour are the best means for the prince to attain reputation. Prudence must foster self-interest, which is the driving force of human activity. In state affairs there is no room for friendships or family relationships and the only bonds on which the prince can rely are those of interest. The art of preserving the state consists primar-
ily in the ability of the prince to preserve and reinforce his as well as the state’s reputation, and this is precisely the object of the art of politics.\(^7^5\)

Paolo Paruta, known for his dialogue *Della perfezione della vita politica* (Of the perfection of political life)\(^7^6\), offers a praise of Venice’s institutions and political system. Central to Paruta’s thought is the definition of politics as the practice and cultivation of civil virtues, and idea elaborated in his *Discorsi politici* (Political Discourses), which appeared in 1599 and was devoted to a forceful justification of the politics of the *Serenissima*. In a very revealing discourse dealing in reality with the legitimacy of Venice’s support of Pisa against Florence, Paruta declares that justice and fairness are not the sole or the most decisive criteria for judging the politics of a republic, since besides them exists a third and more important factor, namely the reason of state (“termini di Stato”).\(^7^7\) An action or conduct that is compatible with justice can still be justified, and even commendable, if dictated by the reason of state. Particularly in the realms of international relations and of foreign policy has to prevail the reason of state, that is the interest of the state or of the Prince.\(^7^8\) Besides, Paruta notes in his *Soliloquio*, a meditation written during a diplomatic mission to Rome, that one cannot serve at the same time two masters, God and the world. The maintenance of the state does not depend on the observance of the laws of God, but rather on good knowledge of the rules of the world and compliance with them, although they might stand in flagrant opposition to the principles of Christian teaching.\(^7^9\)

A decisive step towards the complete identification of the “politica”-discipline with the reason of state was taken by Trajano Boccalini in his *Advertisements of Parnassus*, published in 1612-13. Boccalini launches into an acidic critique of the corruption besetting the states of his time, which results in the pessimistic conclusion that no remedy can be found for it. He equates politics with the mere art of the princes to ensure the durability of their states; unlike the republican writers he believes that the art of politics cannot aim at the salvation of the city from corruption, which has penetrated the body of society already to such an extent that no reform is possible.\(^8^0\) Identifying Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca and Livy as the masters and heroes of Republican politics, he contrasts them with Tacitus, the symbol of the “new political thinkers” and the “Prince of political writers”, as Boccalini calls him in the dedication to Cardinal Borghesi.\(^8^1\)

Tacitus’s *Annals* and *Histories* were the fount of inspiration for the composition of the *Ragguagli*. Boccalini nurtures intense admira-
tion for Tacitus, who stands in his eyes for the new type of political theorist, driven by nature to strive for absolute power and relying on the reason of state for weighing all things.\textsuperscript{82} From Boccalini’s viewpoint, the new art of politics is dictated by an inexorable necessity. It must regard only the prince himself, in contrast to the old art of politics according to which every citizen was expected to be educated to know that art, since the city was then a common possession of the citizens and therefore all of them had to care for her preservation. In contemporary terms, “political precepts” (“precetti Politici”) require the usage of an obscure language because they are addressed not to the base rabble, but exclusively to the prince. In fact, Boccalini warns against the grave danger of revealing the secrets of the practice of new politics to ordinary people, as this would stir up in them the desire to undertake the governing of the state, which could lead to its destruction.\textsuperscript{83} Boccalini adopts a severe attitude toward new politics. In his Pietra del paragone politico, an appendix to the Ragguagli which was published posthumously in 1616, he berates the princes and kings of his day for their faults in governing their states. The sole exception is Venice whose excellence is due to the effective enforcement of various political rules and maxims: the Senate is vigilant in the stability of the laws and institutions of the city, Venetian noblemen are motivated by admirable public spiritedness and modesty, wealth is divorced from insolence, and Venice’s policy is strongly motivated by the preference for peace over expansion, and in this very respect Venice is superior to Rome. One of the further merits of Venetian government lies in the prevalence of impartial justice for noblemen and poor alike as well as in the rigid observation of secrecy in state affairs.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{Concluding Remarks}

Luzzatto is far more outspoken in the Socrate than anywhere else in his writings about the catastrophic consequences of the rulership of the philosophers. His critique of Plato’s political philosophy culminates in the vigorous rejection of the latter’s opinion that the only way to avoid disturbances inside the city is for philosophers to assume the reins of government or for those who are now called kings to have sufficient inspiration from a genuine desire for wisdom as an abhorrent saying that enjoys the common people’s approval.\textsuperscript{85} In case such a misadventure occurred, this would entail the dissolution
of any form of civil life. Likewise, he profiles Diogenes as an ascetic philosopher pursuing a solitary path and being wholly estranged and alienated from worldly affairs. Persons of the sort of Diogenes represent in Luzzatto’s eyes a menace to human society and one should be on alert not to concede them any sort of power. For the rule of such a person and the organisation of the state according to his austere theories would only lead humanity back to a bestial condition. Such pronouncements mark Luzzatto’s radical departure from the medieval tradition of the philosopher-king; Luzzatto reworks elements of the antecedent Islamic and Jewish political philosophy to construct a model of the ideal ruler according to the precepts and the guidelines of the new art of politics, as represented by many Venetian political writers of his own time. His strong defence of Venice’s Jewish element as the sole factor that could promise Venice’s salvation from her deep economic crisis and the revival of her glorious political past displays the influence of the utilitarian approach to politics, which lay at the core of the new tradition of reason of state.

NOTES

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2. See Discorso, fols. 5v-6r, 38v-39r, 44r-v, as well as the preface to this work (fols. 5r-6v). For the historical context and further bibliographical information, see B.C.I. Ravid, Economics and Toleration in Seventeenth-Century Venice. The Background and Context of the ‘Discorso’ of Simone Luzzatto (Jerusalem, 1978) 10ff.; C. Gozzi, Giustizia “contaminata”: Vicende giudiziarie di nobili ed ebrei nella Venezia del Seicento (Venice, 1996); The Autobiography of a Seventeenth-Century Venetian Rabbi: Leon Modena’s Life of Judah (transl. and ed. by M.R. Cohen) (Princeton, NJ, 1988) pp. 143-6, 149. For the reactions against the Discorso, see B.C.I. Ravid, ‘Contra Judaeos in 17th Century Italy. Two Responses to the Discorso of Simone Luzzatto by Melchiore Palontrotti and Giulio Morosini’, Associa-


6. Discorso, Considerations 6 and 7 (fols. 22r-27v).

7. Discorso, fol. 9v. Cf. fol. 73v.

8. Discorso, fols. 22v-23r.

9. Discorso, fols. 34r-35v.

10. Discorso, fol. 22r.


13. Discorso, fols. 35v-r.

14. Discorso, fol. 82v-r.

15. Superstition is used by Luzzatto in this context, as he himself makes clear, in the sense of an irrational or impure belief about God, Discorso, p. 66r.


18. Discorso, fols. 65r-66r.


31. A different opinion is expressed by the Arab philosopher Ibn Bajja (known in the Latin West as Avempace) who, in his work *The Governance of the Solitary*, maintains that in the ideal city the art of medicine and the art of the laws are unnecessary and all opinions are true, and by implication there is absolutely no space for myths and noble lies – Avempace, *Il regime del solitario* ed. and trans. into Italian by Massimo Campanini and Augusto Illuminati (Milan, 2002), pp. 90-6.

32. M. Mahdi (ed.), *Alfarabi’s “Book of Religion” and Related Texts* (Beirut, 1968), p. 43. “To make others understand something is of two kinds: either by making its essence to be truly conceived or communicating an image which symbolizes it. Similarly, judgement is formed in two ways: either by a convincing rational argument or by persuasion. When existents are known and conceived in their essences and judgements are formed
of them on convincing rational arguments, this knowledge constitutes philosophy, but when imagination receives their imitative symbols, and judgements are formed about these symbols by the persuasive method, this type of knowledge was termed by the ancients "religion". See also The Attainment of Happiness, in: *Alfarabi’s Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle* (transl. M. Mahdi) (Ithaca, N.Y. 2001) p. 44.

33. Averroes, *Averroes’ Tahafut al-tahafut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) (trans. from the Arabic with intro. and notes by S. Van den Bergh (E.J.W. Gibb memorial series; N.S.,19/Unesco collection of great works) (Leiden, 1954) p. 582. See E. Tornero, “La función sociopolítica de la religión en Averroes”, *Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía*, 4 (1984) pp. 75-82, and – more generally – A. Merx, “Die Religionsphilosophie des Averroes”, *Philosophische Monatshefte*, 11 (1875) pp. 145-65. According to Leo Strauss, Averroes deduces the necessity of religion from the fact that politics is not in a position to exercise control over human passions. From this viewpoint, religion serves as a decisive factor for the maintenance of the social order. Religion constitutes the result of the conscious efforts of certain individuals who stand out from the multitude, the prophets. These have to look after the moral “health” of the multitude on account of their understanding and their imaginative faculty. Religion is a (religious) law, which is prescribed by prophets, and operates with sanctions. Hence, it is in the interest of the government to favour the observance of the commands and prohibitions that are contained in the religious Law and engender obedience toward the government – Leo Strauss, *Gesammelte Schriften* vol. 1: *Die Religionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft und zugehörige Schriften* (Stuttgart/Weimar, 1996) [originally appeared in 1930 in the series of the *Publications of the Berliner Akademie für die Wissenschaft des Judentums* (Philosophische Sektion)] pp. 77-9. On Straus’ interpretation, which advocates the compatibility of religion and politics, see notably G. Tamer, *Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne. Das Verhältnis Leo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes* (Leiden/Boston/Cologne, 2001) pp. 45-50, 263-86. Similar opinions are expressed by Averroes concerning the function of myths. Cf. also the introduction to *Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics* (translation, introduction, and notes by C.E. Butterworth) (South Bend, IN 2000) pp. 22f. as well as fragments 28 (p. 78) and 51 (pp. 91f.) of the same work and the third chapter of the work *Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy: a translation, with introduction and notes, of Ibn Rushd’s Kitab fasl al-maqal, with its appendix (Daminna) and an extract from Kitab al-kashf’an manahi al-adilla trans. George F. Hourani* (E. J. W. Gibb memorial series; N.S., 21/Unesco collection of great works). (London, 1976) pp. 63-71, and the comments by Hourani on pp. 33-4, 37-8, 112 of the same work.


36. *Discorso*, fol. 46r.


40. *Discorso*, fols. 11v-12r.

42. Laws, Book 6, 777.
43. Discorso, fols. 34r-35v.
45. Discorso, fols. 15v-16r. Cf. fols. 21r-v, 91v-92r, 56v-57r.
46. Discorso, fol. 21a.
47. Discorso, Considerations 11 (fols. 36r-40r) and 15 (fols. 57v-73v).
48. Discorso, fol. 22v.
49. Discorso, fols. 62r-63v.
51. For the following see Socrate, pp. 257-68 and Viterbo, ‘Socrate nel ghetto’, pp. 111-14.
53. Discorso, Consideration 13 (fols. 46r-52v).
55. Discorso, Consideration 15.
57. Discorso, fols. 62v-r.
58. Discorso, fol. 62r.
59. Discorso, fol. 63v.
60. M. Viroli, From Politics to the Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of

61. Discorso, fol. 70.
63. Discorso, fol. 16v.
65. Prince, p. 20.
66. Prince, pp. 89f.
68. Discourses, pp. 107, 304.
69. Prince, pp. 20f.
70. Discourses, p. 498.

72. Della Ragion di Stato, Book I, Chapter 22.
73. Della Ragion di Stato, Book II, Chapter 3.
74. Della Ragion di Stato, Book II, Chapter 3.
75. Della Ragion di Stato, Book I, Chapter 11.

78. Discorsi politici, Book II, pp. 393, 404.
82. I Raggugli di Parnaso, Centuria I, Adv. 29.
83. I Raggugli di Parnaso, Centuria I, Adv. 29.
84. I Raggugli di Parnaso, Centuria I, Adv. 79.
86. Socrate, p. 304.
87. Socrate, pp. 304f.
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